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Abstract 
 
According to recent evidence (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002), the 
traditional Discounted Utility model (Samuelson, 1937) has a limited ability to 
describe realistic models of behaviour and indeed there are several documented 
empirical regularities that seem to contradict this statement both in certainty and 
uncertainty conditions. This study focused on one of the best documented anomalies: 
sign effect or gain-loss asymmetry (Frederick et al., 2002; Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1992; Read, 2004). Specifically, the study investigated the intertemporal preference 
for symmetric monetary rewards and punishments in certain conditions, and the no 
wealth effects hypothesis (Dimitri, 2007) by asking subjects to choose between two 
positive or two negative euro amounts available at different points in time. The 
experimental design applied here followed the same behavioural pattern of the 
neuroeconomics’ study on monetary rewards realized by McClure et al. (2004). The 
results confirmed a gain-loss asymmetry at least for medium and large euro amount 
and suggested new directions of research.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Time preference is a concept originally introduced by Rae (1834) in his study on differences of 
wealth among nations. According to Rae, time preference is determined by four different factors, 
which may positively or negatively affect the desire of accumulation: the bequest motive, the 
propensity to self-restraints, uncertainty of human life and the gratification derived from immediate 
consumption. Time preference was described as an intertemporal allocation of consumption by 
Fisher (1930) who enriched Rae’s view with two additional personal factors: foresight and fashion. 
All these factors were later integrated into the discount rate of the Discounted Utility (DU) model 
(Samuelson, 1937). The DU model is based on various assumptions including stationary 
instantaneous utility, independence of discounting from consumption, diminishing marginal utility, 
positive time preference and, in particular, constant discounting which implies time-consistent 
preferences. Time consistency means that later preferences are in line with earlier preferences, 
namely preferences are constant across time. Precisely, individual time preferences are time-
consistent if “for any two consumption profiles (ct,…,cT) and (c’t,…,c’T), with ct = c’t, 
U
t
(ct,ct+1,…,cT) ≥ U
t(c’t,c’t+1,…,c’T) if and only if U
t+1
(ct,ct+1,…,cT) ≥ U
t+1(c’t,c’t+1,…,c’T)” 
(Frederick et al., 2002 p.358).  
Although this model has been widely accepted and applied to the study of intertemporal choice, 
according to recent evidence (Frederick et al., 2002; Read, 2004), the classical DU model has a 
limited ability to describe realistic behaviour. Particularly, while DU assumes that the discount rate 
is the same for all time periods and different types of outcomes; there are several documented 
empirical regularities that seem to contradict this statement, both with certainty and uncertainty 
conditions. The present study focuses on sign effect or gain-loss asymmetry (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Read, 2004) which implies that gains are discounted more than losses. 
Specifically, subjects usually prefer to expedite, rather than delay, negative outcomes as depicted by 
classical theory. It is not yet evident whether to consider the sign effect and other empirical 
regularities — such as magnitude effect, preference for improving sequences, or delay-speedup 
asymmetry — as subjects’ errors in performing the task or, instead, as real anomalies of the 
classical DU model. In fact, in their study on workers’ preferences for increasing wage profiles, 
Loewenstein and Sicherman write, “Respondents do not see themselves as violating any such 
fundamental property because they see no contradiction in deriving satisfaction from increasing 
payments, despite the effect on total consumption” (Loewenstein & Sicherman, 1991). 
Nevertheless, this behavioural pattern is observed not only for monetary choices, but also for non-
monetary rewards and punishments.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The empirical study of intertemporal rewards and punishments under certainty may be considered 
to have its roots in experimental psychology and, in particular, in the works by Mischel et al., 
originally conducted on both adults and children in the 60s. Particularly, in Mischel et al. (1969), 
effects of expected time delay on the subjective value of monetary and non-monetary rewards and 
punishments were investigated. The study presented the results obtained in four different 
experiments. In the first, children were asked to indicate their preferences for four different types of 
rewards — 50 cents, a notepad, six packs of chewing gum, 80 cents — and punishments — eat a 
can of bad tasting food, listen to a noise for 15 minutes, spend 30 minutes with an unpleasant 
teacher, or do four difficult tasks in front of the class — available immediately or after a delay of 
one day, one week, or three weeks. Data from this first experiment showed that subjective value of 
children for positive outcomes decreased with time delay and also that immediate rewards were 
preferred to delayed ones, at all delay levels. Nevertheless, this was not true for immediate 
punishments and, indeed, immediate negative outcomes were neither more nor less preferred as 
delayed ones. These results were confirmed in the second experiment in which the two alternatives 
were both delayed (immediate options were no longer available). The third experiment of the study 
was conducted on adults. Although the researchers applied similar experimental procedures, 
rewards and punishments were slightly modified in order to be more suitable for older subjects. 
Data were consistent with the children’s findings for positive outcomes. For losses, instead, adults 
preferred immediate punishments to delayed ones, indicating a preference for anticipating losses. 
Since the effect was not so significant, however, Mischel et al. carried out a final experiment in 
which they asked participants — adults — choose between different electric shocks. In particular, 
the electric shock was higher in voltage and time duration for one group and lower for a second 
group. These differences were applied in order to investigate the relative importance of punishment 
intensity. As a result, Mischel et al. found that the stronger shocks were less preferred. Moreover, 
subjects tended to choose the more immediate shock irrespectively of the intensity and the duration, 
confirming previous results. Note that Mischel et al. also found no correlation between the state of 
anxiety and the results obtained in this fourth experiment. The general findings by Mischel et al. 
were consistent with experimental research on children (Grusec, 1968), adults (Hare, Krebs, 
Creighton, & Petrusic, 1966) and with shorter time delays (Cook & Barnes, 1964; Hare, 1966).  
The work by Mischel et al. inspired a subsequent experiment on monetary losses, realized by the 
psychologists Yates and Watts (1975). In their study, participants had to choose between two 
monetary options that they would prefer to pay. Each binary option was represented by a pie and 
was different in monetary amount to be repaid (-$1 and -$2) and time delay (15, 35, or 75 days). 
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They also introduced an element of uncertainty which was indicated by a slight (p=0.6) or complete 
(p=1) darkening of the pie. Binary choice with identical net amounts was also presented under 
controlled conditions in which other participants were invited to select one between two positive 
monetary options. Yates and Watts classified their subjects as “deferrers” or “advancers”. Deferrers 
tended to procrastinate the outcome, whereas advancers generally preferred the more immediate 
option. As a result, they found that the number of advancers and deferrers under the two conditions 
was completely different. In particular, in the experimental condition — negative amounts, they 
found an equal number of advancers and deferrers (8 and 8) while in the control condition — 
positive amounts — they found a large prevalence of advancers (18 out of 19). Since the two groups 
obtained comparable scores in the anxiety test, this was not due to a possible state of anxiety. Given 
these facts, their data analysis supported the hypothesis that people were typically agreed to 
expedite monetary gains but not losses as in Mischel et al. (1969). Yates and Watts attributed this 
kind of result to the possibility that Mischel et al. were unsuccessful in separating, in the subject’s 
perception, compensation for participation and real outcome for preferred choice. As a matter of 
fact, punishments were not perceived as real negative outcomes by subjects.  
As far economists, some years later, Thaler (1981) continued to investigate the issue of gains and 
losses in intertemporal choice in the framework of dynamic consistency (Strotz, 1955-56). In his 
study, participants were asked to complete four different forms. For each form three immediate 
monetary amounts were given: $15, $250, or $3000, in the first; $75, $250, or $1200, in the second; 
and $15, $250, or $3000, in the third. Different time delays for these three euro amounts were 
given: 3 months, 1 year, or 3 years, in the first form; 6 months, 1 year, and 5 years, in the second 
form; 1 month, 1 year, and 10 years, in the third form. The fourth form was characterized instead by 
three negative dollar amounts: -$15, -$100, and -$250. Time delays were, in this case, 3 months, 1 
year, and 3 years. Data revealed very high implicit discount rates, negatively correlated with both 
size of the outcome, for gains and losses, and time delay, for gains only. Most important, these rates 
were smaller for losses than for gains. Compared with the previous studies of Mischel et al. and 
Yates and Watts, Thaler introduced longer time delays — years instead of days. Nonetheless, he 
also provided evidence for sign effect as Mischel et al., confirming that intertemporal preferences 
for gains and losses are not the same.  
Later, Loewenstein (1988) and Benzion et al. (1989) applied Thaler’s method of implicit discount 
rates in other experiments on intertemporal preferences for monetary gains and losses, obtaining 
similar results. In particular, Loewenstein (1988) investigated the frame effect in intertemporal 
choice of monetary rewards and punishments; that is, how different questionnaire formats 
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influenced the weighting of waiting and, in general, intertemporal choice (the connections between 
question frame and discount rates for gains and losses have been also investigated by Shelley, 
1993). Loewenstein also found higher discount rates for gains than for losses, confirming previous 
findings by Thaler (1981). Loewenstein suggested that waiting for a punishment is generally 
unpleasant. Consequently, waiting for a negative outcome introduces an additional cost which could 
be responsible for lower discount rates. In contrast, waiting for a reward could be pleasant or 
frustrating depending on the outcome. In particular, waiting is frustrating for people with 
impulsivity and self-control problems. This is especially true when the delay is initially unexpected 
or when both the amount of the outcome and the time delay are high.   
Benzion et al. (1989) proposed a questionnaire to participants with items from four different 
scenarios: postpone a receipt, postpone a payment, expedite a receipt, and expedite a payment. As a 
matter of fact, one could consider scenarios one and three as gain frames, two and four as loss 
frames. Data analysis confirmed the previous results of Thaler (1981). Benzion et al. found, in fact, 
that implicit discount rates were decreasing as time delay and monetary amount increased and, in 
particular, such rates were smaller for losses (scenarios two and fourth) than for gains (scenarios 
one and three). Although the findings of Benzion et al. supported the hypothesis of sign effect. 
Implicit discount rates were smaller than in Thaler and, moreover, differed widely across 
participants. Benzion et al. underlined that this last result could be determined by inter- and intra-
individual differences in economic knowledge or approach regarding the future. Note that in this 
experiment the immediate option was not available and, in fact, time delays were 6 months (which 
is the more immediate option), 1, 2, or 4 years.  
As noted earlier, gain-loss asymmetry has been investigated not only for monetary outcomes but 
also for non-monetary rewards and punishments. In particular, Loewenstein (1987) reported the 
results of a study in which participants were asked to indicate the amount that they would pay 
immediately to have $4 or a kiss from their favourite movie star, for gains, and avoiding to lose -$4, 
-$1000, or receiving an electric shock, for punishments. These rewards and punishments were 
immediately available (three hours) or could be delayed for 24 hours, 3 days, 1, or 10 years. Data 
revealed that implicit discount rates were higher for non-monetary rather than for monetary items. 
Moreover, subjects were willing to pay more for a non-monetary reward — the kiss — which was 
not immediately available and for avoiding a non-monetary punishment — the electric shock — 
which was delivered with long time delays, that is one or three days.  
Preference for anticipating aversive events was also demonstrated to be a very robust preference 
pattern by Prelec and Loewenstein (1998). In their study, Prelec and Loewenstein presented a 
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“double-entry mental accounting model” which took into account both the pleasure of consumption 
and the pain of paying, which could adversely affect consumption itself considering the payment as 
a potential loss. To test the model, Prelec and Loewenstein conducted an experiment in which 
participants were asked to plan a vacation in a luxury apartment. Considering that the apartment 
cost them $3000 for three weeks, participants were also required to rate different hypothetical 
situations. Indeed, different combinations for vacation time and payment for consumption were 
given. As a result, Prelec and Loewenstein found that the majority of people actually preferred 
prepayment or, at least, to alternate consumption with payment for the vacation. In any case, 
however, participants mainly avoided situations in which the vacation payment was entirely 
delayed. These findings not only refuted the statement that the discount rate should be constant for 
all time periods and different types of outcomes but also confirmed the hypothesis that people 
prefer to expedite payments, which was in line with previous studies with monetary and non-
monetary punishments, as previously mentioned. This particular pattern of choice could be 
connected with the need to be free of payment concerns — during or after consumption — and 
likely derived from a strong debt aversion.  
Based on the state of the art found in the literature, the present study analyzed individual behaviour 
in choosing symmetric monetary rewards and punishments under certain conditions and the no 
wealth effects hypothesis (Dimitri, 2007) in order, primarily, to provide test evidence for sign effect 
or other empirical anomalies (Frederick et al., 2002). Moreover, a statistical analysis was realized in 
order to identify significant variables in the choice between short and long-term positive and 
negative outcomes: euro amount, time delay, and percent difference between the two alternatives of 
choice. Gender and schooling effects were also evaluated.  
 
3. METHODS 
Participants  
Twenty-five students were recruited to participate in the study, including 13 females and 12 males, 
with mean age 25.5 years and standard deviation 5. Each subject took about 21 minutes to complete 
the task (s. d. 7).  
Materials and procedures  
Before the experiment, subjects were told that they were participating in a study concerning the 
theory of cognitive processes in decision making. They were instructed that there were no correct 
answers, but that they were required to state their preferences in a series of positive and negative 
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choice tasks. Subjects were informed that at the end of the experiment they would be paid €5 in 
cash as a participation fee and told they could receive an additional reward which would be paid in 
the form of a top-up mobile telephone. Specifically, the final reward given to each subject would be 
determined by random extracting — the uniform distribution was applied — one of the positive and 
negative choices they made. The choices selected were added and approximated to the nearer top-
up mobile telephone’s size for a minimum of €8 and a maximum of €15. The top-up would be made 
on the day calculated as the mean between the time delays of the selected preferences. Given this, 
subjects were explicitly told that because of this payment scheme they would make choices as if it 
were the one they were actually going to receive. This method of reward was thought of in order to 
tie the monetary incentive to the performance task.  
Stimulus presentation and behavioural response collection were controlled by the software Superlab 
(4.0, Cedrus Corporation, Inc.). Stimuli were adapted from the experimental paradigm used by 
McClure et al. (2004) on immediate and delayed monetary rewards. The first two questions in the 
task were fixed to allow subjects to get acclimated to task performance and acquire familiarity with 
the experimental tools. Each subject completed a task comprising 240 positive and negative 
monetary choices (120 gains and 120 losses) displayed as a pair of sentences. Choices were 
generated by combining three different variables: size of the outcome, time delay and percent 
difference. Three different smaller, earlier euro amounts were used as possible outcomes (€A): 
small (€5), medium (€15), and large (€30) for gains; symmetric small (-€5), medium (-€15), and 
large (-€30) for losses. For both gains and losses, there were five possible time delays between the 
late and the early euro amount: today-2weeks, today-1month, 2weeks-1month, 2weeks-
1monthand2weeks, and 1month-1monthand2weeks. The percent differences in Euros between the 
two alternative of choice [(€A’-€A)/€A] were 1%, 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, 35%, or 50%. The 
larger amount (€A’) was set so that [(€A’-€A)/€A] was the desired percent difference. The smaller, 
earlier gain/loss was always presented on the left side of the computer screen and the sequence of 
choices were randomly generated by Superlab. The choice between the early and the late amount 
was always for the same type of monetary outcome (gain or loss), and each stimulus was presented 
only once.  
Each experiment was conducted in only one session. Subjects were sitting in front of a computer 
screen on which the task was presented. For each choice, subjects were asked to select the key A or 
L on the keyboard for respectively selecting the smaller, earlier alternative or the larger, later 
outcome. No time limits were given for the experiment. Once the subject made the choice, the 
screen remained white for 500 milliseconds to signal the presentation of the new stimulus. Each 
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choice was made with the event editor of Superlab using black Geneva 72 pt fonts on white screen 
colour (R=250; G=250; B=250) (Figure 1).  
Data were analyzed using software R (2.7.2, R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Inc.).  
 
 
Figure 1. Temporal sequence of events during trials of the experimental session (gain and loss, respectively) 
 
4. RESULTS  
Descriptive analysis of the data revealed that subjects preferred the smaller, earlier alternative for 
gains (61.50%) with a percentage that was decreasing with the value of the euro amount. For losses, 
instead, even if there was not a clear pattern of preference for one of the two options — and indeed 
the difference between the preference for the smaller, earlier loss and the larger, later one was of 
only 4.8% (Figure 2); outcomes were typically delayed for small outcomes (-€5) but expedited for 
intermediate and large ones (-€15 and -€30). Considering gender, moreover, males showed a little 
more preference for the larger, later option for losses (52.56%) and smaller, earlier one for gains 
(60.96%); whereas females tended to choose the smaller, earlier alternative for both losses and 
gains (57.78% and 62.08%, respectively), yielding results in the opposite direction. These results 
were reasonably consistent between both graduates and undergraduates, even if the first group 
seemed to be more undecided than the second one between smaller (earlier) and larger (later) 
alternatives.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of responses for gains (on the left) and losses (on the right) 
Analysis of the variable time delay revealed that preferences were rather swinging and this is 
especially true for losses. From the point of view of percent difference between the two alternatives 
of choice, instead, it was possible to discern a particular pattern of choice. Indeed, the percentage of 
responses for early losses was increasing with the percent difference between the smaller, earlier 
and the larger, later outcome (Figure 3). The higher increment was observed between 5% and 10% 
(13.33%) and 15% and 25% (13.60%). Inversely, considering choices that involved gains, the 
pattern of choice was decreasing. Nevertheless, the higher percentage of responses continued to be 
between 5% and 10% (-16%). As a matter of fact, subjects expedited gains and delayed losses when 
the percent difference between the two alternatives was low (up to 5%). In contrast, they delayed 
gains and expedited losses when the percentage was large (from 25% to 50%). For intermediate 
percent differences (10% and 15%), subjects preferred the early alternative irrespective of the sign 
of the payoff. This findings were consistent for both gender and schooling.  
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Figure 3. Percentage of responses for gains (on the left) and losses (on the right) for percent difference between 
the smaller, earlier and the larger, later outcome 
For completeness and accuracy, data were also analyzed with the analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
for multiple regression analysis. Because of the complexity of the experimental paradigm, however, 
the significance of the variables was also valued with logistic-normal model for binary data 
(Agresti, 2002), obtaining quite similar results. As a result, for positive choices, the analysis yielded 
a significant effect on different variables: euro amount (p<0.001), time delay (p<0.001), percent 
difference (p<0.001), schooling (p<0.01), and age (p<0.001). The analysis completed for negative 
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choices yielded a significant effect for all variables: euro amount (p<0.001), time delay (p<0.001), 
percent difference (p<0.001), gender (p<0.001), schooling (p<0.05), and age (p<0.001). Combining 
positive and negative choices, the analysis yielded significant effect for euro amount (p<0.001), 
gender (p<0.001), and schooling (p<0.001).  
Matching analysis  
The data from the study were also modelled and interpreted by matching subjects’ answers for 
symmetric gains and losses. So, we can refer to this additional behavioural result as matching 
analysis. For simplicity, a specific code was assigned to the possible combinations of matching: 
code 0 if the subject preferred the earlier alternative for symmetric gain and loss; code 1 if the 
subject preferred the later alternative for symmetric gain and loss; code 2 if the subject preferred the 
earlier gain but the later symmetric loss; code 3 if the subjects preferred the later gain but the earlier 
symmetric loss. In accordance with the pattern of choice, code 0 and code 1 were defined as 
concordant; whereas, code 2 and code 3 were discordant. The aim of the matching analysis was to 
verify if subjects were time-consistent. As noted earlier, time consistency means that later 
preferences are in line with earlier preferences, namely preferences are constant across time. 
Considering both gains and losses, in particular, a person is dynamic consistent if she prefers a 
larger, later gain and a smaller, earlier loss or vice versa (Dimitri, 2007). As a result, only codes 2 
and 3 could be considered as time-consistent. Matching results for the behavioural study are 
summarized in Table 1 and Figure 4.  
Code  
  
Total 
Total  
(%) 
0  730 24.33 
1 313 10.43 
2 1115 37.17 
3 842 28.07 
Total 3000 100 
 
Table 1. Matching results (number and percentage of responses)   Figure 4. Percentage of responses for matching  
As Table 1 shows, code 2 was the most preferred with a percentage of 37.17%, followed by code 3 
(28.07%), code 0 (24.33%), and code 1 (10.43%). As a matter of fact, subjects preferred the 
smaller, earlier gain but the larger, later symmetric loss, even if the gap between the two most 
preferred codes was not really large (9.1%). The pattern of choice described by code 2 continued to 
be consistent across all the variables investigated (euro amount, time delay, and percent difference 
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between earlier and later outcomes); even if, code 3 was chosen when the euro amount and the 
percent difference between the smaller, earlier and the larger, later outcome were high (€30 and 
25%, 35%, or 50%) or when the time delay was long (1month-1monthand2weeks). Note that 
although they cannot be considered as consistent intertemporal preferences, the percentage of 
responses for discordant codes, especially code 0, was high. In reference to the matching analysis, 
males and females were quite different in their preferences according to their level of education. 
Specifically, with higher levels of schooling, females tended to move from code 3 (30.93%) — and 
0 (30.97%), to code 2 (38.06). Inversely, males increased their capacity of long-term planning 
moving from code 2 (45.28%) to 3 (35.63%); even if the percentage assigned to code 3 was not far 
from code 2 (35.21%). We have to notice that the female pattern did not seem to be influenced by 
instinct as suggested by reaction time. These switching effects are displayed in Table 2.  
Code 
Undergraduates Graduates  
Males Females Males Females 
Total 
(%) 
0 (%) 20.74 30.37 14.38 30.28 24.33 
1 (%) 8.43 9.07 14.79 14.72 10.43 
2 (%) 45.28 29.63 35.21 38.06 37.17 
3 (%) 25.56 30.93 35.63 16.94 28.07 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 2. Matching by sex and schooling (percentage of responses) 
The analysis of variance yielded a significant effect for euro amount (p<0.001), percent difference 
(p<0.05), schooling (p<0.01), and gender (p<0.001), for gains, and euro amount (p<0.001), time 
delay (p<0.001), percent difference (p<0.001), gender (p<0.01), and age (p<0.001), for losses.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study was to investigate individual behaviour in choosing symmetric monetary 
rewards and punishments under certainty. We also evaluated the effect of monetary amount, time 
delay, percent difference, gender, and schooling. As in previous research, results showed that gains 
and losses are not equal and seem to be drawn by different internal principles of choice. First of all, 
according to previous findings (Frederick et al., 2002), evidence for gain-loss asymmetry was 
found, although only for intermediate and large euro amounts. Specifically, despite there was not a 
distinct pattern of preference for one of the two given losses at a general level, subjects really 
expedite negative outcomes when the loss was intermediate or large (-€15 and -€30). Instead, for 
gains, we found a preference for earlier, smaller alternatives, independently of the size of the 
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outcome. Note that in previous studies (Bickel & Madden, 1999; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; 
Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997) people who preferred short-term rewards were found to 
show impulse and addictive behaviours and lack of self-control. Secondly, considering the percent 
difference between short and long-term alternatives of choice, the percentage of responses for early 
outcomes was increasing for losses and decreasing for gains, as the percent difference variable 
raised. In fact, subjects expedited gains and delayed losses when the percent difference between the 
two alternatives was low (up to 5%) but, inversely, they delayed gains and expedited losses when 
this percentage was large (from 25% to 50%). As a result, the present findings also suggested that 
magnitude effect, another empirical regularity which contradicts the classical DU model, played 
here a specific role in intertemporal choice, at least for losses. Thirdly, preferences among different 
time delays were swinging, especially for losses; therefore, we could not identify a particular 
pattern of choice. Fourthly, switching effects were revealed for both males and females with 
increasing level of education and, indeed, females reversed their choices from code 3 to code 2, 
whereas males moved precisely in the opposite direction (from code 2 to 3). Note that gender 
differences in preferences were also found in Croson and Gneezy (2009). Finally, according to the 
statistical analysis, we found significant p-value especially for euro amount, gender and schooling.  
As stated in the literature reviewed, sign effect is not new in empirical research and indeed gain-loss 
asymmetry was found both for monetary and non-monetary rewards and punishments. Particularly, 
most previous studies found that gains are discounted more than losses (Benzion et al., 1989; 
Loewenstein, 1988; Thaler, 1981) and non-monetary punishments have been found to be preferred 
sooner than later (Loewenstein, 1987; Mischel et al., 1969). The question of sign effect, however, is 
still open and indeed there are also other empirical studies highlighting that people do not 
overwhelmingly prefer to anticipate punishments (Yates & Watts, 1975), which is also summarized 
in Read (2004).  
In light on these findings and for better understanding gain-loss asymmetry, we suggest to guide 
further researches on gains and losses in intertemporal preferences towards new empirical directions 
as the result of a multiple-motive approach. The paper by McClure et al. (2004) represented an 
important step in the neuroeconomics of intertemporal choice; however, their study considered only 
monetary rewards. Now, it could be of interest to realize additional studies with both positive and 
negative alternatives of choice (Xu, Liang, Wang, Li, & Jiang, 2009). This kind of study could 
verify the possibility of different neural circuits in the processing of immediate and delayed losses 
as well, and it can also verify if these activations are the same as those that emerged for gains. A 
similar project could contribute to cognitive economics, considering intertemporal preferences with 
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more detail, and to neuroscience by deepening the interaction among neural systems. This new 
direction is obviously filled with critical aspects but thanks to neuroscience tools it is now possible 
to proceed in this worthwhile direction.  
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APPENDIX. Supplementary data 
Table 1. Stimuli list 
Gains 
1. €5.00 today vs. €5.05 2 weeks 
2. €5.00 today vs. €5.05 1 month 
3. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.05 1 month 
4. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.05 1 month and 2 weeks 
5. €5.00 1 month vs. €5.05 1 month and 2 weeks 
6. €15.00 today vs. €15.15 2 weeks 
7. €15.00 today vs. €15.15 1 month 
8. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €15.15 1 month 
9. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €15.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
10. €15.00 1 month vs. €15.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
11. €30.00 today vs. €30.30 2 weeks 
12. €30.00 today vs. €30.30 1 month 
13. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €30.30 1 month 
14. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €30.30 1 month and 2 weeks 
15. €30.00 1 month vs. €30.30 1 month and 2 weeks 
16. €5.00 today vs. €5.15 2 weeks 
17. €5.00 today vs. €5.15 1 month 
18. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.15 1 month 
19. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
Losses 
1. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.05 2 weeks 
2. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.05 1 month 
3. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.05 1 month 
4. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.05 1 month and 2 weeks 
5. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€5.05 1 month and 2 weeks 
6. -€15.00 today vs. -€15.15 2 weeks 
7. -€15.00 today vs. -€15.15 1 month 
8. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€15.15 1 month 
9. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€15.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
10. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€15.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
11. -€30.00 today vs. -€30.30 2 weeks 
12. -€30.00 today vs. -€30.30 1 month 
13. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€30.30 1 month 
14. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€30.30 1 month and 2 weeks 
15. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€30.30 1 month and 2 weeks 
16. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.15 2 weeks 
17. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.15 1 month 
18. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.15 1 month 
19. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
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20. €5.00 1 month vs. €5.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
21. €15.00 today vs. €15.45 2 weeks 
22. €15.00 today vs. €15.45 1 month 
23. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €15.45 1 month 
24. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €15.45 1 month and 2 weeks 
25. €15.00 1 month vs. €15.45 1 month and 2 weeks 
26. €30.00 today vs. €30.90 2 weeks 
27. €30.00 today vs. €30.90 1 month 
28. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €30.90 1 month 
29. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €30.90 1 month and 2 weeks 
30. €30.00 1 month vs. €30.90 1 month and 2 weeks 
31. €5.00 today vs. €5.25 2 weeks 
32. €5.00 today vs. €5.25 1 month 
33. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.25 1 month 
34. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
35. €5.00 1 month vs. €5.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
36. €15.00 today vs. €15.75 2 weeks 
37. €15.00 today vs. €15.75 1 month 
38. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €15.75 1 month 
39. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €15.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
40. €15.00 1 month vs. €15.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
41. €30.00 today vs. €31.50 2 weeks 
42. €30.00 today vs. €31.50 1 month 
43. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €31.50 1 month 
44. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €31.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
45. €30.00 1 month vs. €31.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
46. €5.00 today vs. €5.50 2 weeks 
47. €5.00 today vs. €5.50 1 month 
48. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.50 1 month 
49. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
50. €5.00 1 month vs. €5.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
51. €15.00 today vs. €16.50 2 weeks 
20. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€5.15 1 month and 2 weeks 
21. -€15.00 today vs. -€15.45 2 weeks 
22. -€15.00 today vs. -€15.45 1 month 
23. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€15.45 1 month 
24. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€15.45 1 month and 2 weeks 
25. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€15.45 1 month and 2 weeks 
26. -€30.00 today vs. -€30.90 2 weeks 
27. -€30.00 today vs. -€30.90 1 month 
28. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€30.90 1 month 
29. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€30.90 1 month and 2 weeks 
30. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€30.90 1 month and 2 weeks 
31. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.25 2 weeks 
32. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.25 1 month 
33. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.25 1 month 
34. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
35. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€5.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
36. -€15.00 today vs. -€15.75 2 weeks 
37. -€15.00 today vs. -€15.75 1 month 
38. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€15.75 1 month 
39. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€15.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
40. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€15.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
41. -€30.00 today vs. -€31.50 2 weeks 
42. -€30.00 today vs. -€31.50 1 month 
43. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€31.50 1 month 
44. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€31.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
45. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€31.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
46. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.50 2 weeks 
47. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.50 1 month 
48. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.50 1 month 
49. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
50. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€5.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
51. -€15.00 today vs. -€16.50 2 weeks 
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52. €15.00 today vs. €16.50 1 month 
53. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €16.50 1 month 
54. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €16.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
55. €15.00 1 month vs. €16.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
56. €30.00 today vs. €33.00 2 weeks 
57. €30.00 today vs. €33.00 1 month 
58. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €33.00 1 month 
59. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €33.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
60. €30.00 1 month vs. €33.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
61. €5.00 today vs. €5.75 2 weeks 
62. €5.00 today vs. €5.75 1 month 
63. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.75 1 month 
64. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €5.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
65. €5.00 1 month vs. €15.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
66. €15.00 today vs. €17.25 2 weeks 
67. €15.00 today vs. €17.25 1 month 
68. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €17.25 1 month 
69. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €17.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
70. €15.00 1 month vs. €17.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
71. €30.00 today vs. €34.50 2 weeks 
72. €30.00 today vs. €34.50 1 month 
73. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €34.50 1 month 
74. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €34.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
75. €30.00 1 month vs. €34.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
76. €5.00 today vs. €6.25 2 weeks 
77. €5.00 today vs. €6.25 1 month 
78. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €6.25 1 month 
79. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €6.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
80. €5.00 1 month vs. €6.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
81. €15.00 today vs. €18.75 2 weeks 
82. €15.00 today vs. €18.75 1 month 
83. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €18.75 1 month 
52. -€15.00 today vs. -€16.50 1 month 
53. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€16.50 1 month 
54. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€16.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
55. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€16.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
56. -€30.00 today vs. -€33.00 2 weeks 
57. -€30.00 today vs. -€33.00 1 month 
58. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€33.00 1 month 
59. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€33.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
60. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€33.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
61. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.75 2 weeks 
62. -€5.00 today vs. -€5.75 1 month 
63. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.75 1 month 
64. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€5.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
65. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€15.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
66. -€15.00 today vs. -€17.25 2 weeks 
67. -€15.00 today vs. -€17.25 1 month 
68. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€17.25 1 month 
69. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€17.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
70. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€17.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
71. -€30.00 today vs. -€34.50 2 weeks 
72. -€30.00 today vs. -€34.50 1 month 
73. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€34.50 1 month 
74. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€34.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
75. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€34.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
76. -€5.00 today vs. -€6.25 2 weeks 
77. -€5.00 today vs. -€6.25 1 month 
78. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€6.25 1 month 
79. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€6.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
80. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€6.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
81. -€15.00 today vs. -€18.75 2 weeks 
82. -€15.00 today vs. -€18.75 1 month 
83. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€18.75 1 month 
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84. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €18.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
85. €15.00 1 month vs. €18.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
86. €30.00 today vs. €37.50 2 weeks 
87. €30.00 today vs. €37.50 1 month 
88. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €37.50 1 month 
89. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €37.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
90. €30.00 1 month vs. €37.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
91. €5.00 today vs. €6.75 2 weeks 
92. €5.00 today vs. €6.75 1 month 
93. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €6.75 1 month 
94. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €6.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
95. €5.00 1 month vs. €6.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
96. €15.00 today vs. €20.25 2 weeks 
97. €15.00 today vs. €20.25 1 month 
98. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €20.25 1 month 
99. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €20.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
100. €15.00 1 month vs. €20.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
101. €30.00 today vs. €40.50 2 weeks 
102. €30.00 today vs. €40.50 1 month 
103. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €40.50 1 month 
104. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €40.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
105. €30.00 1 month vs. €40.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
106. €5.00 today vs. €7.50 2 weeks 
107. €5.00 today vs. €7.50 1 month 
108. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €7.50 1 month 
109. €5.00 2 weeks vs. €7.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
110. €5.00 1 month vs. €7.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
111. €15.00 today vs. €22.50 2 weeks 
112. €15.00 today vs. €22.50 1 month 
113. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €22.50 1 month 
114. €15.00 2 weeks vs. €22.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
115. €15.00 1 month vs. €22.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
84. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€18.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
85. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€18.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
86. -€30.00 today vs. -€37.50 2 weeks 
87. -€30.00 today vs. -€37.50 1 month 
88. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€37.50 1 month 
89. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€37.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
90. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€37.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
91. -€5.00 today vs. -€6.75 2 weeks 
92. -€5.00 today vs. -€6.75 1 month 
93. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€6.75 1 month 
94. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€6.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
95. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€6.75 1 month and 2 weeks 
96. -€15.00 today vs. -€20.25 2 weeks 
97. -€15.00 today vs. -€20.25 1 month 
98. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€20.25 1 month 
99. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€20.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
100. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€20.25 1 month and 2 weeks 
101. -€30.00 today vs. -€40.50 2 weeks 
102. -€30.00 today vs. -€40.50 1 month 
103. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€40.50 1 month 
104. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€40.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
105. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€40.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
106. -€5.00 today vs. -€7.50 2 weeks 
107. -€5.00 today vs. -€7.50 1 month 
108. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€7.50 1 month 
109. -€5.00 2 weeks vs. -€7.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
110. -€5.00 1 month vs. -€7.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
111. -€15.00 today vs. -€22.50 2 weeks 
112. -€15.00 today vs. -€22.50 1 month 
113. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€22.50 1 month 
114. -€15.00 2 weeks vs. -€22.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
115. -€15.00 1 month vs. -€22.50 1 month and 2 weeks 
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116. €30.00 today vs. €45.00 2 weeks 
117. €30.00 today vs. €45.00 1 month 
118. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €45.00 1 month 
119. €30.00 2 weeks vs. €45.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
120. €30.00 1 month vs. €45.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
116. -€30.00 today vs. -€45.00 2 weeks 
117. -€30.00 today vs. -€45.00 1 month 
118. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€45.00 1 month 
119. -€30.00 2 weeks vs. -€45.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
120. -€30.00 1 month vs. -€45.00 1 month and 2 weeks 
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